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Commentaries

Why I Don’t Teach Administrative Law
(And Perhaps Why I Should?)
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON*
This Commentary reflects upon the challenges of teaching Administrative Law today.
Drawing upon the author’s own career trajectory and his commitment to a critical account
of law and adjudication, the article seeks to question the foundations of both administrative
law and critical theory. It offers no comprehensive or cogent plan as to what to do, but insists
upon the relevance and importance of combining both legal theory and legal doctrine in a
convincing pedagogical approach.
Ce commentaire porte sur les défis qui accompagnent aujourd’hui l’enseignement du
droit administratif. S’inspirant de la propre expérience professionnelle de l’auteur et de
son engagement envers un compte rendu fidèle du droit et de l’arbitrage, cet article remet
en question le fondement tant du droit administratif que de la théorie du criticisme. Il ne
propose aucun argument exhaustif ni convaincant sur ce qu’il y aurait à faire, mais insiste
sur l’à-propos et l’importance de combiner dans une approche pédagogique convaincante la
théorie et la doctrine juridiques.

A COUPLE OF YEARS AGO, I was approached by my Dean, Lorne Sossin, to teach
a high enrolment course in Administrative Law. Te School was in a bit of a
bind and the clock was ticking. I had never taught Administrative Law before,
but had written in the area and kept a weather eye open for recent comings and
goings in legal doctrine. Tis meant that I knew enough to sense that this was
no easy undertaking and could not be done without some serious preparation.
*

Distinguished Research Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto,
Canada. Tis essay is based upon a talk that I gave at London School of Economics in
October 2014 at the invitation of Tom Poole. I am grateful to Tom Poole, Jennifer Leitch,
Lorne Sossin, other friends and colleagues, and, of course, my Administrative Law Class of
2014 for critical assistance and intellectual support.
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Nevertheless, against my better judgment and with Lorne’s encouraging charm,
I agreed to give it a shot. I had racked up some professional debts to Lorne and
the school and decided that this was one way to settle my account. Administrative
Law it was to be.
As I began to get myself up to speed, I remembered Antonin Scalia’s famous
quip that “administrative law is not for sissies.”1 I took this more as a thrown
gauntlet than a shot across the bow. I was no academic sissy and relished the idea
of taking on a fresh challenge. Also, over the years, I had made much of the fact
that my colleagues needed to be less precious in their expressed unwillingness
to teach in anything other than their areas of narrow specialization. In the past,
I had taught Constitutional Law without having much background in it and
had emerged relatively unscathed (and much the wiser). So it was a kind of
put-up-or-shut-up moment for me. However, as I soon realized, it was another
instance when my bravado got the best of me. I had acted in haste and now
had ample time to repent at leisure. Was Administrative Law a bridge too far?
Was the gig up?
*****
As with much of my teaching, I started with the operating premise of the
great Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.—why is that some of the greats had wonderful
monikers to match?—that lawyers, and especially judges, “spend too much time
shoveling smoke.”2 It was my job as a critical theorist and professor to clear
away some of that murkiness and reveal, for good and/or bad, what lay beneath.
My general go-to position was that it was important to read between the lines as
much as read the lines themselves; the sub-text and larger context of judgments
was as illuminating as the text itself. Tis did not mean that legal doctrine was
not to be taken seriously, only that it was not be taken too seriously. What was
not said and why it was not said gave meaning and force to what was said and
why it was said. So, whether teaching Tort Law (as I had done for many years) or
Administrative Law (as I had not done before), I adopted the same critical frame
of analysis. To both my relief and chagrin, this proved to be a worthwhile and
rewarding approach.

1.
2.

Antonin Scalia, “Judicial Deference To Administrative Interpretations Of Law” (1989)
1989:3 Duke LJ 511.
Edward W Knappman, Watergate and the White House, vols 1-2 (New York: Facts
on File, 1973).
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Choosing a casebook for the course was easy. Lorne Sossin and Colleen
Flood’s book, Administrative Law in Context,3 seemed to be the obvious choice
both for reasons of pedagogical quality and institutional loyalty. It was as much
a textbook as it was a casebook. As the title suggested, it sought to put the law
side of the administrative process into a more practical and less abstract setting.
I supplemented the book with a series of readings from the leading cases that
were studied in the text. While the book was not the traditional fare of law school
classes, it provided a stimulating, if mainstream, presentation of the law and
courts. I supposed this would provide a convenient foil to my own more critical
comments and skeptical ideas. It was both my life belt and my target.
A good place to begin my preparation was an article that I had written
many years, even decades, before: “Te Rise and Ruse of Administrative Law
and Scholarship.”4 Fittingly, it had been published in the Modern Law Review,
which was the scholarly journal of the London School of Economics (where I
most recently gave a talk that was the origin of this essay).5 On re-engaging with
the piece as much from a reader’s perspective as from that of an author, I was
struck by its strident and uncompromising tone. It was the product of an ‘angry
young man’ who thought that he had much to prove to the world about the law
and, as importantly, about himself. It took a take-no-prisoners stance on the
development of modern administrative law and the contributions of its judicial
and academic apologists. I felt a little sheepish about this approach as I am no
longer as angry nor as young, but I took some solace from the fact that at least
I was, if I may, ‘man’ enough to speak my mind, and that my mind was pretty
much on the right track.
Te main thrust of the article was that judges are part of a deeply ideological
enterprise in which the need to make political choices, even if masked is inevitable.
Moreover, despite eforts by mainstream theorists, especially Ronald Dworkin,
to demonstrate that these choices are the law’s and not those of judges personally,
I insisted that no background theory could pull of that jurisprudential feat:
Legal doctrine does not conform to any simple logic and is unifed only by its
enduring indeterminacy … With imagination and industry, legal materials can be
organised so as to support radically inconsistent positions. In so far as it is possible to
defend a variety of plausible theories, no one proposal can lay claim to exclusivity or
universality. Meaningful interpretation is only possible where there already exists a
3.
4.
5.

Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, Administrative Law in Context, 2nd ed (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery Publications, 2013).
Allan C Hutchinson, “Te Rise And Ruse Of Administrative Law And Scholarship” (1985)
48:3 Mod L Rev 293.
Ibid.
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commitment to a shared set of values. However, as in the political domain, the legal
territory is a focus of confict. Tere is a pervasive matrix of contradictory forces which
prevents the establishment of a sufciently full tradition of shared understandings.
Te indeterminacy of legal doctrine fnds its energy and power in the antithetical
modalities of individual and community. Tis deep logic of contradiction sustains
and ensures an inescapable scheme of doctrinal indeterminacy. Doctrine can be
consistently converted into its own opposite self-image.6

I am less dogmatic and schematic in my approach today. I am also less
persuaded that there is always a “deep logic” at work; this is too formulaic and
analytic. From a more pragmatic perspective, the development of legal doctrine is
best characterized as being more about muddling through than the manifestation
of some structural dynamics. Te need to connect judicial activity with legal
theory remains paramount, but I have a less imperialist and grand understanding
of what theory is or can do; it is more an artistic endeavour than a scientifc one.
However, I still very much retain a critical stance and hold the view that the best
account of law is summarized by the notion that it is “indeterminacy with a cut.”7
When I frst started teaching, I was haunted by the same insecurity that I had
as a student. While preparing for an Evidence class, I strove to explain and present
the relevant legal doctrine in terms of a coherent and convincing framework.
In this way, law could be understood as the entirely rational enterprise that it
was proclaimed to be. Any failure to achieve that state of academic repose was a
personal weakness on my part, not a feature of the legal doctrine. As I walked into
class, I thought that I had it all worked out in my mind. But, as I began to lecture
(and that was what I did to begin with in my early English years), the clarity and
grasp of the doctrine that I had experienced only a few minutes earlier began to
slip away. Instead of being a fnely balanced and rationally sophisticated structure,
it turned out to be so much pie in the sky. Te doctrine collapsed in on itself and
became more accurately depicted as a series of generalized rules with numerous
and discretionary ad hoc exceptions on ad hoc exceptions. I still defy anyone to
articulate the law of hearsay in other terms. It might be said that the smoke was
so thick and so disorienting that even the fimsiest handhold was welcome.
At root, the problem was the foundational belief among judges and scholars
that the law did make sense and that, if it did not, it was the fault of judges
6.
7.

Ibid at 297; see also Allan C Hutchinson, “Mice Under a Chair: Democracy, Courts, and the
Administrative State” (1989) 40:3 UTLJ 374 at 375. Te bottom line was that “the work of
the courts is qualitatively incoherent and…inescapably political.”
Allan C Hutchinson, Towards an Informal Account of Legal Interpretation (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2016). See also Allan C Hutchinson, Te Province of
Jurisprudence Democratized (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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who must be chastised and corrected by academic commentators. For example,
C.P. Harvey’s conclusion that the law of evidence was “less of a structure than a
pile of builders’ debris”8 and Rupert Cross’s observation that judges and lawyers
relied on “distinctions absurd enough to bring a blush to the most hardened
academic face”9 were very much to the point. However, both these esteemed
scholars assumed that the jurisprudential project of making evidence law make
deep and enduring sense was possible and realizable. It simply had not achieved
that exalted status at that moment or in that doctrine.
As I grew in confdence and read more widely, I began to reject the traditional
black-letter and even black-theory standpoint. Te raison d’être of the academic
project was to make sense of legal doctrine, but what that involved was very
much open to contestation. Rather than be content to indicate the non-rational
failings of particular legal doctrines, I set out to elucidate the non-rational failings
of legal doctrine as an entire enterprise. In other words, I set out to make sense
of why legal doctrines and judicial decisions did not make sense. It was essential
that rigour and discipline be brought to that task. Tere might well be instances
in which the fault lay with the critic in failing to grasp the niceties of any slice
of legal doctrine. Tere might be stretches of doctrine and pockets of individual
rules that had a plausible coherence at any particular time and on any particular
occasion. But that coherence was short-lived, superfcial, and contingent; it was
always up for grabs and often did get grabbed by those who framed it to suit their
own purposes. Te overall project of doctrinal scholars was a fool’s errand.10 Once
the smoke cleared, there was only debris strewn around.
Of course, I promoted and purveyed that critical line with an excessive
amount of zeal. On that count, I am guilty as charged. But this ought not to
have diminished nor detracted from the fact that the basic claim was accurate
and compelling—legal doctrine taken as a whole is a patchwork quilt of
compromises and concessions that makes no enduring sense over time and across
discrete subject areas. If there is any sense to be discovered or imposed, it is to be
found in the ever-changing and conficting policies that judges and lawyers seek
8. CP Harvey, Te Advocate’s Devil (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1958) at 79.
9. Rupert Cross, “Te Evidence Report: Sense or Nonsense?” (1973) Crim L Rev 329 at 333.
10. It should go without saying that this was not in any way a unique or untutored insight on
my part. I drew extensively on the original and path-breaking work of the so-called Critical
Legal Scholars. Largely American in base and style, they ofered me a set of resources from
which to fashion my own take on the Anglo-Canadian world of judicial opinions and
academic scholarship. In particular, the work of Duncan Kennedy has been indispensable
and infuential over the years. See Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: Fin de Siècle
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997).
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to achieve as a matter of ideological balancing. In other words, legal doctrine
is hostage to the changing personnel of law and to the changing and often
contradictory impulses of those professional actors. It is not that this amounts
to some closed-door conspiracy of judicial bureaucrats. Most judges act in good
faith in their eforts to make sense of legal doctrines and its apparent limits, and
they profer their judgments as the product of reasoned and reasonable doctrinal
analysis. But the materials available and the resources at hand belie the claim,
express or implied, that the law is something apart from the ideological leanings
of the judges; judicial decision-making is an enterprise of law and ideology.
None of this is to say that all decisions are bad. To say so would be to mistake
the critical thrust of my approach. My claim is that what makes one decision
better than another is simply whether one likes the ideological cut or thrust of
the decision. Some judgments are better crafted than others, but what makes the
good or even great decisions is that the political agendas or interests that they
advance are more acceptable than less acceptable. Decisions are never right or
wrong in any enduring or internally legal way. It is simply that a decision and
its supporting argumentation are more or less palatable in terms of the political
interests that they protect or promote. Moreover, any political deconstruction
of a decision is rarely straightforward or two-dimensional. A simple liberal/
conservative analysis is facile and unconvincing; the interplay of diferent
interests is complex, dynamic, and obscure. Tis is particularly so in an area like
administrative law. Te politics of administrative law are not always obvious or
easily decipherable. Te technical and institutional issues play out across a range
of interests that do not line up easily or at all with those in private law. At bottom,
administrative law is built on courts’ desire to preserve their own legitimacy and
own brand of justice in reviewing the work of the administrative state. Put more
crudely, judges want to ensure that administrators know that they are the bosses.
Of course, the emphasis in administrative law on judicial action and legal
doctrine is itself problematic. Te administrative process comprises much more
than that. Indeed, it is arguable that available legislative checks and balances do
much more efective work than the legal principles and guidelines that result
from judicial review. Nevertheless, for good and bad, judicial law-making and
the resulting doctrinal rules cast a long shadow over the workings and dynamics
of administrative law and process. While this gives some legitimacy to the
intense focus on the work of the courts (along with the general and continuing
preoccupation in law schools with the courts), it cannot justify it entirely. Indeed,
legal education (including its critical antagonists) might do more to perpetuate
this state of afairs than it likes to think. Accordingly, part of my task as a critical
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theorist was to expose the infrm foundations and efects of judicial review not in
order to improve the judicial process, but to encourage greater interest in other
more efective and democratic means to enhance the operation, accountability,
and fairness of the administrative state.
So, in approaching my responsibilities in teaching Administrative Law,
I carried with me a career’s worth of intellectual and jurisprudential baggage. Tis
makes me no diferent than any other teacher; everyone carries some baggage. Te
diference is that my baggage is less mainstream and more critical in substance
and style. Yet, as I began my classes, I was also weighed down by a lingering sense
that my pedagogical duty was to ofer the students as coherent and rational an
account of the legal doctrine in administrative law as I could muster; criticisms
were to be discrete and piecemeal. Tis brought back echoes of the charge that
teachers and scholars like me were “disappointed absolutists.”11 For all my critical
rejection of the formalist mind-set, I was still somewhat in thrall to it. Indeed,
such a schizophrenic mind-set is not surprising if you have lived in an institution
for all your professional life where the dominant approach, despite much
protestation to the contrary, is largely formalistic and rationalistic. So, with the
usual ambivalence and gusto, I began to teach my frst Administrative Law class.
*****
I started the classes by laying my cards on the table. I was very much a known
quantity at school, so little would come as surprising or new to those students
who had enrolled for the course. I told them that, although I had written in the
area, I had not taught Administrative Law before. I spun it such that what they
might lose in my expertise in administrative law would be ofset by what they
might gain in terms of my overall teaching and jurisprudential experience. I also
made plain that, as a committed democrat, I was no fan of courts and that a
signifcant part of the course would be devoted to providing a critical perspective
on both the work of the courts by way of judicial review and the shortcomings
of the administrative process in terms of democratic governance. Te students
seemed to take this in their stride. However, as this was an upper-year course,
I assumed (correctly, as it turns out) that the amount of reading and preparation
would not be great. With that, the adventure began.
I will not trouble or bore you with a day-to-day account of the classes and
the discussions that took place within them. Sufce it to say that there were
ups and downs. However, for present purposes, what is more important was my
11. HLA Hart talks about the realists or rule-skeptics with whom I might be loosely grouped.
See HLA Hart, Te Concept of Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) at 135.
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own engagement with the materials and decisions of the courts, especially the
Supreme Court of Canada. Like the students, I was reading cases that I had never
read before. I came to them with little pre-conception of what they said or did.
But I did come to them, of course, with my own critical approach to law, judicial
decision-making, and teaching. I read the cases as a critical teacher/scholar. I was
not to be disappointed in my expectations or my engagements with them. Try as
I might, it was impossible for me not to view the leading judgments as so easily
and obviously grist for my critical mill. Te leading cases amounted to what
was almost a caricatured tableau of judicial decision-making that said one thing
(i.e., law) and did another (i.e., politics); they were an example par excellence of
law-as-ideology.
From its efective beginnings with Roncarelli in 1959,12 the heart of Canadian
administrative law has been the tension between the courts and the executive.
Te central challenge has been to chart and justify a path between the diferent
institutional claims of each branch of government to ensure that the principles
and promise of democracy are best protected and advanced. Although clothed in
all manner of legal and technical details, this is essentially a clash of politics—
who gets to have the decisive say over how the dealings between citizens and
the administrative state are organized and negotiated? Tis question touches so
many aspects and dimensions of democratic governance and defes easy analysis.
At least as understood by the courts (and that, of course, is of great signifcance),
it has touched upon and given rise to three main doctrines of legal doctrine:
the procedures to be followed by tribunals and executive ofcers, the remedies
available to citizens to correct maladministration, and the need for review of the
substance of decisions made and actions taken.
While there has been considerable toing-and-froing over the frst two
doctrines, it is the third—substantive review—that has generated the most
activity and anguish. Tis is where the institutional rubber hits the governmental
road. Most of this debate has been over how government is made accountable to
the citizenry it is supposed to serve and, as importantly, who is best available to
achieve that objective. Te development of legal doctrine has gravitated between
the difering extents to which the courts can or should interfere in the workings
and wiles of administrative agents and agencies. Tis is captured by the idea of
deference: When and how should the courts defer to the decisions and actions
of the executive? Te courts have insisted that their task is to interpret statutes
against the demands of the Constitution. But no sensible observer could pretend
that the task was as simple or straightforward as that. Te push-and-pull of
12. Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, 16 DLR (2d) 689.
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institutional politics and priorities energizes and backstops that ostensible legal
drama over the standard of review. Indeed, as with so much legal doctrine, it all
boiled down to what the judges thought was the best thing to do.
Beginning with CUPE13 in 1979, the courts have sought to develop and
defend some crucial but vague distinctions between jurisdictional powers and the
exercise of substantive discretion. While the former was to be policed aggressively
and adjudged by norms of correctness, the latter was to be granted more leeway
and measured only against the standard of patent unreasonableness. Tis resulted
in executive eforts to squeeze courts out of the action by relying on privative
or exclusion clauses that sought to oust courts from their supervisory authority.
But the courts were having none of this. Tey raised constitutional concerns
and refused to vacate their role as the privileged underwriters of democratic
legitimacy.14 Even when the legislature was entirely clear that it wanted the courts
to have no supervisory role, the courts took that as merely an indication that
less deference might be warranted. By 1997, the courts had introduced a more
complicated and murky approach that established a tripartite set of standards for
reviewing administrative action. Abandoning the jurisdiction/substance test, they
placed their faith in a nuanced balancing between correctness, reasonableness
simpliciter, and patent unreasonableness.15
For the next decade or so, the courts sought to demonstrate how this
balancing could be operationalized with any consistency or clarity. If the chorus
of criticism was anything to go by, this they failed abjectly. Te judges disagreed
with themselves over how to categorize contested matters and what the subsequent
categorizations meant in practical terms. Te doctrine simply collapsed of its
own weight. Administrative law had become a living manifestation of Tennyson’s
telling characterization of “the lawless science of our law/ … Tat wilderness of
single instances.”16 Although the judicial ambition was to forge a path through
the dangerous thickets of institutional authority and accountability, the result
was to make matters worse, not better. Te doctrinal smoke that the courts
were generating was not fooling anyone and, if it had any real efect, it was to
disorient further the judges themselves. Indeed, I might be forgiven for taking
some comfort from the courts’ capacity to make the critics’ argument for them
and to do so with enviable cogency—the rules of the administrative game shifted
13. CUPE v NB Liquor Corporation, [1979] 2 SCR 227, 97 DLR (3d) 417 [CUPE].
14. Crevier v Quebec (Attorney General), [1981] 2 SCR 220, 11 ACWS (2d) 165.
15. Canada (Director of Investigation & Research) v Southam Inc, [1997] 1 SCR 748,
114 DLR (4th) 1.
16. Lord Alfred Tennyson, Aylmer’s Field (London: McMillan and Co, 1891) at 14.
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and changed, their meaning and application were elusive even to those who set
them, and exceptions popped up as and when the occasion demanded.
Te turning point came with Dunsmuir, although it would prove to be
another and inevitable false dawn. Te point at issue was whether standards of
reasonableness applied to the fring of public employees and, as importantly,
whether a tribunal’s decision on that issue was reviewable by the courts. Te three
judgments of the Supreme Court do as much to continue the confusion as to
dispel it. All the judges agreed that the adjudicator’s decision should be set aside,
but they did so for very diferent reasons and in line with diferent considerations.
For those looking to the Supreme Court for guidance and reassurance, they were
surely disappointed. Although touted as the last word on standards of review,
Dunsmuir is likely to be the last word only until the next last word.
In speaking for the majority, Justices Bastarache and Lebel decided that it was
time reassess “the structure and characteristics of the system of judicial review as a
whole” and develop a principled framework that is “more coherent and workable.”17
To that end, they decided that there should be a reversion to two standards (i.e.,
reasonableness and correctness): “Reasonableness is concerned mostly with the
existence of justifcation, transparency and intelligibility.”18 In deciding which
standard applied, they were less forthcoming. While reasonableness ought to be
the norm, a multi-factored analysis could be used to determine if correctness was
appropriate; these factors included whether there was a true jurisdictional issue,
a privative clause, a constitutional question, a centrally important legal issue, and
the level of the decision-maker’s expertise. Applying this analysis, the majority
held that reasonableness was the proper standard and that the decision-maker
had not acted reasonably in the circumstances. However, Justices Bastarache
and Lebel were not very expansive nor instructive in how such unreasonableness
could be measured.
Justice Binnie took a slightly diferent line. He was more pragmatic and
less enamoured of the majority’s analytical claims: “Judicial review is an idea
that has lately become unduly burdened with law ofce metaphysics.”19 He
took the position that, while a move back to two standards was probably wise,
“a single ‘reasonableness’ standard is a big tent that will have to accommodate
a lot of variables.”20 He went on to indicate that any analysis must necessarily
be contextual and cannot lend itself to easy or exhaustive resolution among the
17.
18.
19.
20.

Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir] at 248.
Ibid at 192.
Ibid at 195.
Ibid at 196.
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relevant considerations. Again, he concluded that reasonableness was the proper
standard and, in relatively short order, that the decision-maker had not acted
reasonably in the circumstances.
Justice Deschamps spoke for her two other colleagues. She went along with
the reduction of the standards from two to three. She came to the conclusion
that this was an occasion on which correctness was the appropriate standard as
the adjudicator had strayed from his area of administrative expertise and into the
realm of legal interpretation. Tis took him beyond the need for deference by
way of the reasonableness standard. So, in line with the rest of the Court, but for
very diferent reasons, she held that the adjudicator’s decision should be set aside
because it was incorrect.
*****
When I frst read the Dunsmuir decision, I experienced that usual mix
of excitement and self-doubt. It was as if I had walked into the middle of a
continuing conversation with only a very general sense of exactly had been said
and done before. I made a game efort to make sense of the judgments in their own
terms and how they might be applied. Yet, try as I might, there were many more
questions than answers. Te superfcial appearance of coherence and workability
gave way to a much more substantial sense of fundamental disagreement and
empty abstraction. Having cleared away the smoke and dug down, I was left
with little more than a pile of builders’ debris. It became obvious (if anything can
be obvious about the decision and its judgments) that Dunsmuir was supposed
to be the occasion on which the Supreme Court laid out for administrative law
a principled framework that is more coherent and workable. Yet, judged by
that standard of the Court’s own choosing, the decision fails; it is not coherent,
workable, nor principled.
First, any coherence that the decision has is merely abstract and only
wafer-thin at that. If coherence is meant to signify that a measure of balance
and intelligibility has been achieved, there is nothing more or less coherent in
having two rather than three categories of review. Even when viewed in its best
light, the attainment of coherence says little about the substantive quality of
the doctrine itself; the doctrine can be good or bad, even if it is coherently so.
However, if “coherent” is being used as a synonym for simpler or more rational,
there is also nothing compelling about the new Dunsmuir test as a simpler or
more rational test. As Justice Binnie notes, “a single ‘reasonableness’ standard
is a big tent that will have to accommodate a lot of variables.”21 Tis strongly
21. Ibid.
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suggests that any claim for simplicity or rationality in the new two-part test is
more apparent than real: Te action has simply been moved from the front to the
back of the legal doctrine. As such, coherence is the proverbial sack that can be
flled with almost any content.
Secondly, the workability of the Dunsmuir framework is undermined by the
Court’s own judges. Tree of the nine judges—Justices Deschamps, Charron,
and Rothstein—pull the rug out from under the decision by failing to agree
on whether the standard of review on these facts should be reasonableness or
correctness. Tis is a major problem. If the majority of the Court cannot persuade
its own colleagues that the test is workable (i.e., it will direct most judges in
similar circumstances to come to the same categorization), what chances are there
that other judges will be able to agree? Apart from the general open-endedness
of what counts as reasonable, any distinction for fxing the standard of review
that cannot be utilized consistently by Supreme Court judges seems to be less
a serious and efcacious test and more an accommodating screen for more
free-wheeling assessments.
As for being principled, this begs the very big question that the Court is
tasked with answering across administrative law: Who should get to set the terms
for distributing responsibility about making the administrative process more
accountable and fair? Troughout the legal doctrine, there is a taken-for-granted
assumption that the legislature and executive cannot be trusted, but that the
courts can be. While there are clearly limitations on the courts’ ability to
over-reach themselves, the courts maintain that they are the trusted guarantors of
fairness and justice. Yet the historical rise of the administrative state and tribunals
had much to do with the unwillingness of the courts to perform their role with
appropriate expertise and political balance. For example, the initial reason for
establishing an administrative structure for human rights and labour relations
was the poor job that was being done by the courts. Moreover, the accountability
of the courts is itself less than robust or extensive. Te judges are quite literally a
law unto themselves; they make the law that they then claim to be governed by.
Tis seems far from being the principled basis that the Supreme Court claims for
its justifcation of administrative law’s development.
Tis general stance was confrmed by some of the cases that followed
Dunsmuir. In blunt terms, the new Dunsmuir world was more smoke and
style than shape and substance. For all the talk about principles and coherence,
it remained a mug’s game to predict what the courts would do in reviewing the
actions or decisions of administrative agencies. Even if there is agreement on
whether the standard is reasonableness or correctness, there is no real sense of
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how a decision will be made as to whether an administrative action is reasonable
or correct. Clearing away the doctrinal smoke, there are simply judges muddling
through in determining if they disagree enough with the disputed administrative
action or decision to set it aside. Describing this as palm-tree justice might be a
little exotic for the Canadian sensibility, but it captures something of the style
and substance of judicial review. Two cases will sufce to make the point.
In Khosa,22 the Court had to decide whether a tribunal’s decision to allow
the deportation of an individual convicted of street racing causing death and
to deny “special relief ” was reviewable. Te Federal Court of Appeal applied
a reasonableness standard and set aside the tribunal’s decision as being
unreasonable. It found that the tribunal had some kind of fxation with the fact
that street racing was involved and no explanation had been given as to why
a favourable rehabilitation report had been ignored. Te Supreme Court took
a contrary stance. A majority declared that the Dunsmuir principles were not
ousted by the relevant governing legislation. Te judges agreed, therefore, that the
reasonableness standard was applicable and that the tribunal had acted reasonably
or, at least, not unreasonably. Te tribunal had reached its own conclusions based
on its own appreciation of the evidence and the decision did not fall outside the
range of reasonable outcomes. Justices Rothstein and Deschamps insisted that
the Dunsmuir principles did not displace the statutory provisions. Nevertheless,
they found that the tribunal’s fndings “were not perverse or capricious or made
without regard to evidence.”23 However, Justice Fish dissented and held that
“deference ends where unreasonableness begins.”24 He went with the majority
on the standard of review being Dunsmuir reasonableness but found that the
tribunal had failed to evaluate the facts and issues in a reasonable way.
Disagreement among the judges in itself is not fatal. But, in Khosa, the
diference of opinion is telling, especially in light of the fact that Dunsmuir
was supposed to represent administrative law in a new light and as a principled
framework that is more coherent and workable. Again, judges on the same court
could neither agree on the appropriate test to be applied (coherence) nor on how
that test should be applied (workability). Te claim to be taking a principled
stance is entirely belied by the confusion and indeterminacy that thread through
the decision and judgments. Despite assertions about the importance of the
Rule of Law, Khosa comes close to confrming the notion of the ‘Rule of Five’
22. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009]
SCR 339 [Khosa].
23. Ibid at para 137.
24. Ibid at 160.
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[should be ‘Rule of Five’ to be consistent]: It is not principle that counts or
determines the legal doctrine, but the number of judicial votes that combine
behind any principle of or putative application.
Te serendipity or even perversity of the judicial process was made even more
apparent in Mowat.25 Tis was a discrimination case and the question was whether
a human rights tribunal could award legal costs to a successful applicant under
a statutory provision that allowed payment “for any expenses incurred by the
victim as a result of the discriminatory practice.”26 While the tribunal and Federal
Court found that it could, the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court
did not. Applying a Dunsmuir analysis, Justices Lebel and Cromwell determined
that the reasonableness standard applied, not correctness. Emphasizing that
this conclusion was based upon deference to the decision-maker’s expertise and
experience, the Court still went on to insist that “no reasonable interpretation
supports [the] conclusion” that the tribunal may award legal costs to a successful
applicant under the rubric of expenses.27 After extensive analysis, the Court set
aside the tribunal’s decision to award costs and held that:
Te text, context and purpose of the legislation clearly show that there is no
authority in the Tribunal to award legal costs and that there is no other reasonable
interpretation of the relevant provisions. Faced with a difcult point of statutory
interpretation and conficting judicial authority, the Tribunal adopted a dictionary
meaning of “expenses” and articulated what it considered to be a benefcial policy
outcome rather than engage in an interpretative process taking account of the text,
context and purpose of the provisions in issue.28

Te efect of this kind of analysis is to collapse reasonableness into correctness.
While there is scope for two courts to disagree over whether “expenses” includes
legal costs, it is preposterous and, ironically, unreasonable to conclude that a
decision that it does is unreasonable. Te fact that this is done in the name of
deference further exacerbates matters. Even the Court admits that the tribunal
was faced with a difcult point of statutory interpretation and conficting
judicial authority. To determine that the tribunal’s decision was unreasonable is
to circumscribe the zone of reasonableness so tightly that it amounts to making
the same decision as the reviewing judges would make. Moreover, the apparent
hands-of approach of the majority in Khosa was disregarded. Tis is a perfect
25. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Mowat, 2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3
SCR 471 [Mowat].
26. Ibid at para 1.
27. Ibid at para 34.
28. Ibid at para 64.

HuTCHInSon, WHy I Don’T TeACH ADmInISTrATIve LAW 1047

example of the courts being long on talk about deference and reasonableness, but
short on any action or application that holds true to those stated ideals. As such,
the Mowat decision is a revealing cameo about how administrative law does and
does not work: It is about generating ‘principled’ smoke to cover the political and
normative debris that lies beneath.29
*****
I hope that there is now some better understanding of why I do not teach
Administrative Law (and perhaps why I should). I do not teach Administrative
Law because I cannot be an administrative lawyer in the sense of presenting
administrative law as even vaguely amounting to “a principled framework that is
… coherent and workable”—not now, not any time. However, perhaps I should
teach Administrative Law as a legal theorist because it will be substantial grist
for my critical mill in that I will be able to show that administrative law, like
most areas of law, cannot be presented as even vaguely “a principled framework
that is…coherent and workable.” As I have sought to show, administrative law
is “all echoes and shadows, like looking into a box of fog.”30 Of course, the same
might be said of other courses that I teach as well. Te structures and features of
administrative law are no diferent in this regard than any other subject area in
terms of their doctrinal opacity and political underpinnings. But that is a topic
for another day.

29. Te smoke thickens, not clears as time goes by. As I fnished this article, the Supreme
Court handed down another decision that does more to confuse than to clarify. In a 4-3
decision, the Court could not agree on what standard of review should be applied, and how,
to a tribunal’s exercise of statutory interpretation. See Commission scolaire de Laval v Syndicat
de l’enseignement de la région de Laval, 2016 SCC 8, 263 ACWS (3d) 396.
30. Kate Atkinson, Started Early, Took My Dog (London: Transworld Publishers, 2010) at 141.

